RECENT CASES by unknown
RECENT CASES
ACCESSION-DocTRINE-EFFECT OF.-BLACKWOOD TIRE & VULCANIZING
Co. v. AUTO STORAGE Co., 182 S. W. (Tenn.) 576.-Held, where the pur-
chaser of an automobile, title to which was retained by the seller, fitted
the machine with tire casings and the seller on nonpayment retook the
machine, title to the tire casings passed to the seller, the seller of the
casings not having retained title, for such is the rule of accession, which
denotes the right of the owner of corporeal property to any increase
thereof from any cause either actual or artificial.
The case carries the doctrine of accession too far. Tire casings are
very easily detached. Such easily distinguishable appliances to machin-
ery may be detached if done without injury to the principal thing. Alley
v. Adams, 44 Ala. 6og. Nor does the doctrine of accession apply in chat-
tel mortgages or conditional sales where new parts of machinery replace
those worn provided they are readily distinguishable and can be removed
without damage to the whole. Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 215. Ordi-
nary repairs upon a personal chattel become a part thereof by accession,
but if easily separable and capable of being distinguished from the arti-
cles to which they have been added, the rule is otherwise. z Cyc. 226;
i R. C. L. i19; Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt 4. It is held that a mortgage
upon a stock of merchandise attaches only to such as was in stock and
not to that added by purchase. Godfrey & Son Co. v. Citizens' National
Bank, 64 Nebr. 477. Similarly where there has been substitutions of one
press for another in a printing establishment, the one under the original
mortgage being set aside. Vinall v. Hendricks, 33 Ind. App. 413. The
principal case extends the doctrine beyond the limits set down by prior
cases.
A. S. B.
CAUUER s-NoTICE OF CLAIMs FOR DAMAGE To LIVESToCK-EFFECT OF
TIME LrIMITATION AS TO RECOVERY FOR INJURIES SUBSEQUENTLY APPEAR-
ING.-BROADHEAD v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., I55 PAC. (KAN.) 20.-
Due to defendant's n'egligent delay, plaintiff's shipment of cattle was
temporarily unloaded, enroute, into pens then being disinfected by order
of the Bureau of Animal Industries. For injury to the cattle by the
dipping and the rough treatment incidental thereto, plaintiff brought suit
without having given notice as required by the contract providing that as
condition precedent to recovery some officer of the company must be
notified in writing before removal or slaughter of the stock, or inter-
mingling with other stock. Verdict for plaintiff, both as to injuries appar-
ent on arrival of the cattle at destination, and injuries developing later.
Defendant appealed. Reversed and remanded. Held, that written notice,
before removal, was not required as to damages apparent on delivery,
but was required as to damages thereafter appearing. West, J., dissents.
In general, a stipulation in the contract of shipment that as a condi-
tion precedent to recovery of damages, written notice of claim must be
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filed before removal of the stock or within a limited time, is reasonable
and valid. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wynn, 153 P. (Okla.) xi56;
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Burnett, 174 S. W. (Ark.) i6; Contra:
Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 6o So. (Ala. App.) 409. But
such a stipulation is to be construed liberally in favor of the shipper.
Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Spears, 3i Okla. 469. It usually does not
prevent recovery for injury to stock which is evident on arrival at its
destination, even though notice be not given, since the carrier has suffi-
cient means of inspecting and notice would not benefit -him. Southern
Ry. Co. v. Bacon, i59 S. W. (Tenn.) 6o2; Ray v. Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co.,
go Kan. 244. Nor is this provision held to apply to claims for damage
from fall in market price or loss of market due to the carrier's delay,
since inspection of the shipment is here immaterial. Riddler v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co., 184 Mo. App. 7o9; Estes v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 113 Pac.
(Colo.) ioo5; Hayes v. Mo. K. & T. Ry., 84 Kan. I. Even where the
protection afforded the carrier is material, however, the right of the
shipper to know and estimate the extent of his full loss is paramount.
To this effect see Eoff & Snapp v. Scullin, i79 S. W. (Ark.) 663; Burns
v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co., 132 S. W. (Mo. App.) i; Pierson v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Pac. (Wash.) 5o9. In these cases it was
held that the stipulation did not apply when the shipper could not
discover the injury to his property or ascertain its extent within the
limited time. The decision in the principal case is probably against the
weight of authority. C.B.
CONFUCT OF LAwS-SECONDARY CONTRACTUAL OBLiGATioN-LAw Gov-
ERNIN.-LINDSAY V. COLLINGS, 182 S. W. (Tex.) 879.-In an action
brought in Texas on a note made and payable in California, and secured
by a mortgage on land there situated, held, that a California statute pro-
viding that a foreclosure of the mortgage shall bar any subsequent action
on the note thus secured, is binding as a part of the law of the contract,
and that a foreclosure of the mortgage may be pleaded in bar of the
Texas suit. Higgins, J., dissenting.
"It is impossible to consider a contract separately from the remedy
given by the law of (for?) its enforcement, because it is this that sup-
plies it with legal validity. . . . It is a branch of its vital existence-
the thing that gives it life. Without it the contract ceases to be ...
The statute invoked provides an absolute defense in the state where the
contract was made; therefore it must be so held in the state where the
suit was brought." Prin. case, 881. The use of the word "remedy"
in this connection is misleading, but it is clearly used to denote the sec-
ondary legal relations under the contract, and not matters of procedure,
like statutes of limitation. See YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. XXV, p. 147.
C. R. W.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-CLAsS LEGISLATION-DIscRImI-
NATION.-PEOPLE V. WEINER, II0 N. E. (Ill.) 87o.-Held, that the Act of
July 1, 1915, of the Illinois legislature which related to the use of second-
hand materials in the manufacture of mattresses, quilts and bed corn-
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forters, but contained no similar provision regarding pillows, was dis-
criminatory, and unconstitutional as class legislation.
The states by adopting the Fourteenth Amendment could not have
intended to impose restraints on the exercise of their powers for the
protection of the safety, health or morals of the community. Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; Minn. &
St. L. R. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. The determination as to the
proper exercise of the police power is not exclusively with the legis-
lature but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Lawton v. Steel,
152 U. S. 133; Atkin v. Kansas, 1i1 U. S. 2o7. The legislature in carry-
ing out an ordained purpose may classify, whenever the propriety in
doing so appears to exist. Chicago Ry. Co. v. R. R. Com., 173 Ind. 469;
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79. The classifica-
tion as a general rule must be based on some sound reason and must
be applicable to all who are within the natural scope of its enactment.
Gulf Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 1So; State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. n3;
State v. Gabroski, In Iowa 496; Barber v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 3. How-
ever, having a reasonable basis, it need not operate with mathematical
nicety. Batchell v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36. A legislative classification may
rest on narrow distinctions, and a discrimination is valid if not arbitrary
in that it is outside of the wide discretion which the legislature may exer-
cise. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 251. Heath &
Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338 (distinction between mixed and
paste paints); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (statute
exempting farmers' mutual insurance companies from its operation). In
the recent case of Chang Sing et al. v. City of Astoria, 155 Pac. 378, the
supreme court of Oregon, on the other hand, declared a statute invalid as
class legislation and discriminatory in which stores selling hardware, dry
goods, and the like were regulated, but those selling tinware, crockery
and tobacco were not included. So, as regards the principal case, it is
difficult to ascertain on what reasonable ground, in the light of the authori-
ties, the legislature could have drawn a valid distinction between the
subjects included and those excluded from the operation of the act.
J. McD.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INURIES To THIR PERsoN CAUSED BY SERVANT-
ScoPE OF EmPLoYmENT.-MANIACI V. INTERURBAN ExPREss CO., 182 S. W.
(Mo.) 98r.-Where a consignee of goods, while signing a receipt, under
protest, at request of agent of the Express Company, was shot by
said agent suddenly and without just cause, held, that a declaration setting
forth these facts states a cause of action, in that the agent was acting
within the scope of his employment Woodson, C. J., and Blair and
Walker, JJ., dissenting.
A master is liable for the wilful or malicious acts of his servants
where they are done in the course of his employment and within its
scope, i. e., to promote the master's business. Houston & T. Cent. Ry.
Co. v. Bell, 73 S. W. (Tex.) 56; Peddie v. Gaily, io9 N. Y. App. Div.
178. On the other hand, the master is not liable where the servant is
acting for personal reasons. Brown v. Boston Ice Co., 178 Mass. io8;
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Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse Co., 189 Mass. 419; Meehan
v. Morewood, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 566. In determining whether or not an
act is within the scope of employment, the purpose of the act, rather
than its method of performance, is the test. Cobb v. Simon, ii9 Wis.
597. An assault by a servant may be within the scope of the employ-
ment so as to render the master liable. McClung v. Dearborne, 134 Pa.
St. 396; Barden v. Felch, IOg Mass. 154; Houston & T. Cent. Ry. Co.
v. Bell, supra. However, an assault by a servant not committed as a
means or for the purpose of performing the work which he was employed
to do is ordinarily not within the scope of his employment and the
master is not liable. Mogh v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 8o Ill. App. 411;
Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse Co., supra; Meehan v. More-
wood, supra. If a servant shoots a third person, the act is ordinarily
not within the scope of his employment, especially where he is not a
watchman or detective or the like. Lytle v. Crescent News & Hotel
Co., 7 Tex. Civ. App. 530; Turley v. B. & M. Ry. Co., 7o N. H. 348;
Bowen v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 136 Fed. 3o6 (Defendant company held not
liable for the shooting of a consignee of goods by a freight agent, with-
out just cause, after the consignee had signed a receipt and was about
to leave the office). In the principal case the act complained of was
clearly unnecessary to the performance of the agent's duties, and the
ruling seems contrary to the weight of authority.
E. J. M.
RAILRoADS-LEASE OF TRACxAGE-LIABILiTY OF LESSOR.-CENTRAL OF
GEORGIA Ry. Co. v. BEssINGER, 87 S. E. (Ga.) 92o-Plaintiff in error
leased trackage rights to a lumber company. Defendant in error, an
employee of lumber company, was injured while being carried to his
work on a lumber train. Held, employee sustained relation of passenger
to railroad company to the extent that it is bound to exercise extra-
ordinary diligence to keep from injuring him. Russell, C. J., dissenting.
In the absence of authority to lease its road a railroad company that
so leases is liable for all the negligence of the lessee affecting the pub-
lic. Hukill v. Maysvitle & B. S. R. Co., 72 Fed. 745. This is because
it is contrary to public policy that public duties imposed by law be shifted
without authority, and the lessee is therefore treated as the agent of
the lessor. Arrowsmith v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 57 Fed. 165. To grant
trackage rights over a railroad is not an abdication of duties but a proper
exercise of the franchise to operate a railroad. Union Pacific v. C. R. L
& P. R. Co., 163 U. S. 564. Under such conditions there is no rela-
tion of principal and agent, and the only liability of the owner company
is for failure to keep its tracks free from defects. Hamilton v. Louisiana
& N. W. R. Co., 117 La. 243. The holding of the principal case seems
to stand alone.
R. C. W.
TITLE TO WILD GAME--CHANGE OF COMMON LAW RULE, BY STATUTE.-
PEOPLE V. WILLIAMS, 155 PAc. (Colo.) 323.-The defendant was charged
with unlawfully and wilfully having in his possession a portion of the
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carcass of a deer contrary to the fish and game laws. The information
was quashed on the ground that it charged no offense, stated no facts
that constituted an offense, and was in violation of Sec. 25, Art. 2, of the
state constitution, which provided that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The people brought
error. Reversed and remanded -Held, that the Revised Statutes of i9o8
declaring, by Sec. 2739, all game and fish not already legally acquired, to
be the property of the state, and, by Sec. 2748, possession unaccompanied
by license or permit to be prima facie evidence of illegal taking and hold-
ing, made the defendant's possession of a portion of a carcass of a deer,
unexplained, a violation of the act, and cast upon him the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. White, Hill and Teller, JJ., dissenting.
At common law title to wild game was nowhere until reduced to posses-
sion. The right to regulate and even prohibit the taking thereof has,
however, always been an attribute of sovereignty. 2 BI. Comm.. 410.
And under the modern police power it vests in the respective states.
Rupert v. U. S., i8i Fed. 87; Commonwealth v. McComb, 227 Pa. 377;
People v. Martin, 107 N. Y. S. io76. But it is a police power only;
those decisions which speak of a title to wild game in the whole of the
people of the state collectively, do not refer to a true property right
such as the state, like an individual, has in physical objects reduced to
its control. Bondi v. Mackay, 89 Atl. (Vt.) 228; Commonwealth V.
Patsone, 231 Pa. 46; State v. Ashman, i35 S. W. (Tenn.) 325. Accord-
ingly, at common law the individual had a right to take game except as
prohibited, and an indictment for violation of the game laws must show
which particular provision of the statute is relied upon. 2 Cyc. 324.
The reversal of this procedure, sustained by the majority opinion in the
principal case, depends upon a literal interpretation of the statute, i. e.,
transmission of actual title to the state. The dissent points out that
since, if such were the fact, a general prohibition would be inferable,
the only essential part of the statute would be the express permissions
contained in Secs. 2833, 2749, 28oi, 28o9, and that Sees. 2753, 2759, 2876,
2877, in so far as they are prohibitions (as the majority holds) and not
merely fixing of penalties, are "unnecessary and tautological." As regards
the possibility of statute vesting true title in the state, see opinion of
Field in Geer v. State, supra, and the case of U. S. v. Shauver, 214 F. 154
(same as regards title in migratory birds in the United States, holding it
impossible by the nature of the subject matter). Also see Acklen. v.
Thompson, ins Tenn. 43, where a statute similar to that in the principal
case was held not to change the common law doctrine.
C. B.
